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The likelihood of your being targeted for
initial assessment usually depends upon circumstances over which you have
little or no control. Circumstances that increase the chances include the
following.
- The most obvious consideration, but not
necessarily the most important, is the value of the information, people,
or places to which you have access. The greater the value of your
access, the more likely you are to be selected for contact, assessment,
and (if you appear susceptible) for recruitment. Your value to a foreign
intelligence service does not depend upon rank. Support personnel
such as secretaries, computer operators, and maintenance personnel may
be able to provide access to very valuable information. It is easy to
overemphasize the extent to which the value of your access determines
your chances of being targeted. Foreign intelligence officers are under
pressure to recruit agents just as salesmen are under pressure to make
sales. Their career advancement depends upon it, but they also need to
avoid getting caught. As a result, they may go after the easiest or most
available target, rather than take the risk of going after the most
valuable target.
- You are more likely to be targeted and
assessed if you are stationed in a foreign country or often travel
there. All foreign intelligence or security services have far more
resources available in their home country than in the United States.
There is much less risk for them when they are operating on their home
turf, and they are far more active and aggressive there.
- Even within the United States, you are more
likely to be targeted if you are in an area and in a position where it
is relatively easy for foreign nationals to contact and assess you. For
example, foreign diplomats, journalists and lobbyists are constantly
working Capitol Hill in search of contacts and information. Personnel at
industrial sites and national laboratories that have foreign scientists
on site and many foreign visitors are more likely to be targeted than
personnel at sites with few foreign nationals on site and few foreign
visitors.
- If your cultural, ethnic, or religious background
differs from some so-called norm in any obvious way, you are also
more likely to be targeted and assessed. Many foreign intelligence
operatives have limited understanding of American culture and commonly
think in stereotypes. If they put you in any stereotypical category
of persons they believe are more likely to be supportive of their
interests or to be disadvantaged, bitter, or alienated, you are
more likely to be targeted for initial contact and moved quickly
into the operational contact phase. Foreign intelligence operatives
find it easier to contact, build rapport with, assess, and manipulate
individuals with whom they can claim to share a common interest
-- including a shared national, ethnic, or religious background.
1
Personnel in these more vulnerable categories need to be aware
of their vulnerability and be especially prompt in reporting any significant
foreign contact. The more attractive you are as a target, the greater
the chances that a foreign national who befriends you is an intelligence
operative.
Lest there be any misunderstanding on this
point, there is no evidence that naturalized citizens are less loyal than
native-born citizens. Many naturalized citizens have a stronger loyalty to
the United States than native-born citizens, who often take their country for
granted. There is also no evidence that members of any disadvantaged or
minority group are more susceptible to recruitment than other Americans.
Opportunities for foreign intelligence
officers and agents to arrange face-to-face meetings to assess targets in the
United States have increased dramatically. The openness of the post-Cold War
environment, growing global commerce, and increasing espionage by our friends
in addition to our adversaries have increased the vulnerability of all of us
to assessment by multiple foreign intelligence collectors.
Reference
1. Tony Capaccio, "FBI: Ethnic
Targeting Common Tactic in Economic Espionage," Defense Week, March
25, 1996. Article is based on presentations at a seminar sponsored by the
National Counterintelligence Center, March 11, 1996.
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